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THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICE
POWER OF THE STATE
power of the state is one of the most difficult phases
T HEof police
our law to understand, and it is even more difficult to
define it and to place it within any bounds. In speaking of this
power the court has recently said:
"It extends not only to regulations which promote the
public health, morals, and safety, but to those which promote the public convenience or the general prosperity. * *
It is the most essential of powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least !imitable of the powers of
government." 1
The term is nowhere found in our Constitution, and it first
appears in our jurisprudence slightly less than one hundred years
ago. It found no place in Bouv~:ER.'s LAW DICTIONARY until 1883,
and the UNITED S'l'A'l':ES DIG:ES'l' did not contain it until 1879. Yet
the idea is an old one and played no unimportant part in our Constitutional Convention.
The idea is embodied in our theory of dual sovereignty. The
framers of our Constitution were close students of Blackstone, and
from him they had learned the lesson of divisible sovereignty. Due
to tne peculiar situation in which they were placed, in that they were
attempting to unite thirteen distinct sovereignties into one nation,
they found it not only right but necessary that sovereignty should
should be divided. It was fortunate that the state constitutions,
whether they were survivals of colonial days or not, were all made
with the idea of operating under some form of external authority.
The common interests alone were committed to the general government, and the 'residual sovereignty' which remained with the states
was the seed from which has grown the immense powers of 'Eminent Domain' and the 'Police Power.' It has been fittingly said
that the police power-

*

"was so named by Chief Justice Marshall * * * as a result
of the perception * * * of the truth that in spite of all constitutional limitations from the side of the central govern1

Eubank v. Richmond,

226

U. S. 137.
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ment there must remain in the states an indefinite fund of
legislative and governmental power to provide for the countless actual and conceivable emergencies of local government."2
The idea of the police power is very clearly found in the FEnERALIST.3

"In this relation (operation of the government) the proposed governme~t cannot be deemed a national one, since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects."

says Madison. 3 This 'residual sovereignty' was rightly left with
the states, but it was never intended that this sovereignty residing
in the states should ever override any one of those fundamental
guarantees set down. in the Constitution. Absolute sovereignty
belongs to neither nation nor state, and should either encroach on
the limits of the other the basis of our government is weakened.
The term police power is not found in the court decisions until
1827, but the idea was clearly in the mind of the Chief Justice when
he delivered the decision in the Dartnwuth College Case.4 In this
decision he said :
"The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain
the states in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted
for internal government, and that the instrument they have
given us is not to be so construed is admitted."
Again, in the great commercial case of Gibbons v. Ogden5 he said:
"The acknowledged power of the state to regulate its
police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens may
enable it to legislate on this subject to a considerable extent."
Three years later, in 1827, the case of Brown v. Maryland 6 was
2 Hastings, "The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions
Relating to the Police Power of the State," PROC~DINGS OF TH~ A.MJ;;RICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL SocmTY, Igoo, No. 39, p-. 379.
3 Number 39.
4 4 Wheat. SI8.
5 9 Wheat. I.
6 I2 Wheat. 4I9. This case had to do with the validity of a law requiring
an importer to take out a license from the state before he could sell an
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decided. Taney's ingenious argument, that to hold the law in question unconstitutional would not only strike a blow at the taxing
power of the state, but would seriously endanger a state's power
to protect itself from dangerous imports such as gunpowder, was
not easily answered. Here we "are not interested in Marshall's reply
to the first point, but in answer to the second he said :
"The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch
of the police power which unquestionably remains and ought
to remain with the states."
Here for the first time we meet the term police power, and it is
used to emphasize the doctrine of 'residual sovereignty' applying
to those cases where the public is to be protected. The term was
not taken into immediate use, and we do not find it accepted immediately by politicians or judges. In Mr. Calhoun's famous resolutions of December, 1837, he has the idea, but he does not use the
term. In discussing the relation between slavery and the Union,
and in seeking for a solution to the already burning question, he
proposed that,
"Any intermeddiing of any one or more states, or a combination of their citizens, with the domestic institutions or
police of the others on any ground, political, moral, or religious, should be deemed unconstitutional." 7
In fact, not until the same year, ten years after it had first been
used, do we meet the term again. In the case of Mayor of City of
New York v. Miln 8 we find Justice Barbour quoting Marshall's own
words. But while he quotes the former statement he does not adopt
the term generally, although he entirely accepts the idea of police
article which had been imported. Such a law Chief Justice Marshall decided
to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was a tax on imports, and as
such forbidden by the Constitution. This case is also of interest because
in it the 'original package doctrine' was first formulated.
1 Schurz, lliNRY CLAY, Vol. 2, p. 156.
s II Pet. 102. The question before the court was whether an act, providing that the master of every ship entering Ne\V York should render,
within twenty-four hours after arrival, a statement of name, age, etc., of
all alien passengers, and placing a fine upon his failure to do so, was constitutional.
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power.9 The end desired by the law in question was to prevent the
influx of paupers and criminals, and the means as given by law is
upheld on the basis of protecting the safety, happiness, prosperity,
and general welfare of the people. Judge Barbour goes so far as
to say that all' state legislation having this high purpose in view "is
complete, unqualified, and exclusive." That the term was used in
this case by mere accident seems evident when we consider that at
the same term of court was decided the important case of Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,1° in which the term does not appear.
But beginning at about this time it became widely used and has since
then occupied an important place in our jurisprudence.
It may be asked why did the term and the idea meet at this time
with such popularity? The answer is to be found in the condition
of the country at that time. The new Jacksonian party had come
into power in 1828, and with it had come the doctrines of the frontier. New economic problems had to be faced, and the slavery
question had become the storm center of the time. But with the
coming of Jackson the Supreme Court had remained Federalist,
and the controlling hand of John Marshall still rested on our judicial system. Between 1834 and 1837 the court had changed. Taney
had become Chief Justice, Wayne had taken Johnson's place, and
Barbour had succeeded Duval. The last stronghold of Federalism
had fallen. Marshall had heiJ.rd the last two mentioned cases argued,
but because four judges had not concurred a rehearing had been
ordered. According to Story, Marshall judged the laws in question
to be unconstitutional, yet they were upheld by the new court as
being proper state enactments. This sudden change on the part of
the court naturally attracted attention from the public at large, and
9 In this connection the court says: "A state has the same undeniable
and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial
limits as any foreign nation where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or
restrained by the Constitution of the United States; that by virtue 0£ this
it is not only the right but the bounden and solemn duty of a state
to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity 0£ its people, and to provide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it
may deem conducive to these ends where the power over particular subjects
or the manner in which exercised is not surrendered or restrained in the
manner just stated."
10 II Pet. 420.
.
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we find not only Congress but the papers speaking of the police
power.
The real reason for adopting the police power lay deeper; it lay
in the great slavery controversy. Not so many years previous the
New England states had met in the Hartford convention, and threats
of secession had first been brought forth. But during the intervening years the North had gained numerically, and they were now in
control. Moreover, they had been thrilled by Webster, and had
adopted his doctrine of an indissoluble Union. They had to find
some theory with which they could combat the Southern States
Rights doctrine, and yet they believed in the 'residual sovereignty'
of the states. So when the court offered its police power to pacify
the 'disturbing spirit of slavery,' the North took it for its own.
Indeed, it has been said that "The term police power was almost as
much a federalist and a northern expression as state sovereignty was
anti-federalist and southem." 11 Because most of the early cases
dealing with the police power involved commerce does not prevent
this from being true. Neither the South nor the courts were anxious
to have the question discussed at bar, but those cases which did arise
were decided by the court as undoubtedly the framers of our Constitution would have decided them. To a discussion of two of these
cases we will now tum.
The case of Prigg v. P ennsylvania12 contains the next reference
to police power by our Supreme Court. The case brought before
the court the fugitive slave law and a state's right to legislate on
this subject. The court agreed unanimously that the law by which
the plaintiff had been indicted and found guilty of removing a slave
by force from Pennsylvania to Maryland was unconstitutional; but
what they failed to agree on was whether the right of concurrent
legislation on this subject, so long as it was not contrary to any act
of Congress, rested with the states. Judge Story delivered the opinion of the court, and having held that the Constitution recognized
property in slaves, he denied a concurrent power on the part of the
states, but he e.xpressly says that the court recognizes and will protect the police power.13 Taney's concurring opinion denies the
supra, p. 377.
16 Pet. 539. •
13 "We are by no means to be understood in any manner whatsoever
to doubt or interfere with the police power belonging to the states in virtue
i1 HASTINGS,

12
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exclusiveness of Congress to legislate on the question of fugitive
slaves, and he also discusses the question with reference to the police
power. We are not interested here in the question of the exclusiveness of Congress' commercial power, but the question of interest is
whether such legislation on the part of the states should be upheld
as being an exercise of the police power or as being a concurrent
commercial power residing in the states. In discussing results which
would follow should the states not be permitted to legislate as to
fugitive slaves, Taney says:
"It seems supposed that laws nearly similar to those I have
mentioned might be passed by the state by virtue of her powers over her internal police, and by virtue of her right to
remove from her territory disorderly persons."
Thompson, as did Daniel, thought that a state had concurrent power
over this subject. Justice Wayne took an opposing position.14
- McLean's position is uncertain, as he devotes himself to the question whether the purpose of the article in question was to protect
the slaveholder, and that if this is so an injustice would be worked
if the enforcement of it was left in the hands of hostile states. The
court virtually decided to call this power by which a state acted on
fugitive slaves the police power, and they aligned it with Madison's
'residual sovereignty.'15
of their general sovereignty. That police power extends over all the subjects within the territorial limits of the states * * * and * * *'is entirely
distinguishable from the right and duty of claiming and delivering slaves
which comes from the general government."
1 4 Thompson does not discuss the relation of the subject to the police
power. Daniel, and here I follow Hastings, freely uses the term police
power, and "calls attention to the fact that dealing with a fugitive merely
as such, so long as he neither disturbs or threatens the domestic tranquility,
is a matter of foreign relations and not of police." "Under such circumstances he would not be a proper subject for the exertion of the police power.
If not challenged under a different power of the state, his escape would be
inevitable." "If arrested by the exercise of the police power he would, as
far as he was subjected to that power of the state, be taken out of that of
his master, and thus the invocation of this police power, so far from securing
the rights of the master, would be made an engine to insure the deprivation
of his property." Wayne mentions the police power only in denying to the
states all right of legislation over this subject except such "as may be of
strictly police character."
15 In the discussion of Prigg v. Pennsylvania I have followed Hastings'
excellent analysis.
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The case of Moore v. Illinois16 came up in 1852. A law providing
that no one should harbor a slave or prevent the master from retaking him was upheld as being a "regulation for the restraint and
punishment of crime, for the preservation of the health and morals
and the public peace." 17 Here we have a peculiar situation:
"A state law that forbids harboring a slave is due exercise
of the police power. A state law that forbids a master from
taking his slave and removing him by force out of the commonwealth without the exhibition of some legal process is
not. And the distinction is to be sought in the nature of a
power exercised in each case.'' 18
The great controlling power of the national government over the
people is e..'Cercised through the grant of commercial power, that of
the states is exercised by the police power. While the court tries
to ascribe separate fields to each, the attempt has never been successful and the two are continually coming into conflict.
Two early cases involved in this struggle are of great interest
and importance, for we see in them the general attitude of the court
toward the police power. The License Cases19 involved the question of the constitutionality of laws requiring a license to sell liquor.
As in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the decision was unanimous, and again the judges were unab.Ie to decide on any common
reason upon which they could base their decisions. The court was
unanimous in its decision that these laws were constitutional, but
they had the difficulty which will always confront a body of men
16

14 How. 13.
Wayne went on to say: "In the exercise of this power, which has
been denominated the police power, a state has a right to make it a penal
offense to introduce paupers, criminals or fugitive slaves within their borders; and to punish those who thwart this policy by harboring, concealing
or secreting such persons." He does not enter into a discussion of concurrent power; he refrains from it when he says: "That the defendant is thus
subject to two punishments, one by the state and another by the nation, is
not a good objection, as he is subject to two sovereignties and his act is a
violation of the laws of each and therefore constitutes two offenses." Justice McLean dissented on the ground that since Congress has control over
fugitive slaves the whole question is removed from the police power of the
state.
18 HASTINGS, supra, p. 404.
19 5 How. 504.
i1
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who feel that they are especially chosen to regulate the relation of
discordant states, when they are suddenly called upon to fix practical rights. They were satisfied that the measures were passed by
virtue of the police power, but again the real question was whether
the states had a concurrent power over commerce. Taney admits
such concurrent power. 20 McLean advances an entirely new theory,
and one which is scarcely tenable. He argues that the spheres of
the nation and the state are different, and that within its own sphere
each is supreme. So he thinks that these laws are in no sense regulations of commerce.21 With him agrees Justice Grier. Justice
Catron agreed with the Chief Justice, while Daniel and Woodbury
deny any power of concurrent legislation in the states. Taney's
20 Taney is emphatic in his belief that the states have some power over
this subject, so long as they do nothing contrary to an act of Congress. In
referring to Gibbons v. Ogden he says: "Moreover, the court, on pages 205,
2o6, distinctly admits that a state may in the execution of its police and
health laws make regulations of commerce, but which Congress may control.
It is very clear that so far as these regulations are merely internal, and do
not operate on foreign commerce or commerce among the states, they are
altogether independent of the power of the general government and cannot
be controlled by it." In other words, he believes the laws to be regulations
of commerce, and as such subject to the control of Congress. Later he asks:
"What are the police powers of a state? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent
of its dominion, and whether a state passes a quarantine law or a law to
punish offenses * * * or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in
every case it exercises the same power: that is to say, this power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its own
dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates, and its authority
to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health
laws, e.."l::cepting so far as it has been restricted by the Constitution of the
United States."
21 "A license to sell an article, foreign or domestic, as a merchant, an
innkeeper or a victualer, is a matter of police and revenue within the power
of a state." In speaking of the police power and the power of Congress, he
says: "Neither of them can be so exercised as to materially affect the other.
The sources and objects of these powers are exclusive, distinct and independent, and are essential to both governments. The one operates upon
foreign commerce, and the other upon the internal concerns of a state * * *
and if the foreign article be injurious to the health, safety or morals of
the community, the state may, in the exercise of that great and conservative
police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit the sale
of it. * * * Such a regulation must be made in good faith and have for its
sole object the preservation of the health or morals of society."
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view seems to be the most practical in that it does not tend toward
separatism. If the police power is the only authority by which the
states can legislate, and if it is absolute, every enactment is an exercise of it, and continual clashes with congressional laws are inevitable. His decision does not, however, give the sharp distinctions
which the people at that time wanted, and it left the relation of state
and nation as undecided as before.22
This debate was continued two years later in the Passenger Cases. 23
These cases arose because of a law of New York authorizing a tax
on every person landing in New Yark City, the tax to go to the support of the marine hospital; and because of a Massachusetts regulation providing that officers be appointed to prevent and idiot or
person incompetent to earn a living from entering the state, unless
bond be given that such person would not become a public charge
within ten years. In an opinion by Justice McLean, the court
decided that such laws were unconstitutional. The Justice still
holds to his theory of different spheres, here on the basis that to
suppose the power of the states to be subordinate to the power of
the nation "degrades the states by making their legislation to the
extent stated subject to the will of Congress." But by dwelling on
the subject of conflicting legislation he adds force to Taney's argument that the spheres cannot be separate, and at the same time the
validity of state legislation be made to depend upon its conformity
to the legislation of Congress. That the police power and the commercial power are different he feels sure.
"No one has yet drawn the line clearly between the commercial power of the Union and the municipal power of a
state."2 "'
22 In concluding his discussion of this case, Hastings says: "To appreciate the importance attached to every shred of power by the adherents of
state and national authority, respectively, the steadily growing slavery dis•
cussion and sectional bitterness must be kept in mind. The license cases
are almost precisely contemporary, with the Wilmot proviso, and the mission
of Mr. Samuel Hoar to South Carolina as agent of the commonwealth of
Massachusetts to look after the interests of colored seamen, her citizens,
seized from their vessels in Charleston harbor. He left the city on the
advice of the city and state authorities that he was not safe, and they could
not or would not protect him."
23 7 How. 283.
24 In referring to the relation of police power and taxation, McLean
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Justice McLean then finds an exclusive commercial power and an
exclusive police power; and he depends upon the ingenuity of the
court to separate them should they become entangled. Little wonder that four judges could not accept such a task at a time of such
ardent and heated popular discussion over the status of the states.
Justice Taney finds that the right of expulsion includes the right
of exclusion, and in quoting New York v. Miln he holds that th~
states have such taxing powers as these laws give. 25 Only Justices
says: "The police power of the state cannot draw within its jurisdiction
objects which lie beyond it. * * * In guarding the safety, health and morals
of its citizens a state is restricted to appropriate and constitutional means.
If extraordinary expenses be incurred an equitable claim to an indemnity
can give no power to a state to tax objects not subject to its jurisdiction."
Justices Wayne, Catron, McKinley and Grier filed concurring opinions. Justice Wayne proclaimed that the states have no concurrent power over commerce. In replying to the statement that these laws were passed by virtue
of the police power, he asks: ''What is the supreme police power of the
state? It is one of the means used by sovereignty to accomplish that great
object, the good of the state. ***Police powers, then, and sovereign powers
are the same. The former being considered as so many particular rights
under that name or word colfectively placed in the hands of the sovereign.
* * * How much of it have the states retained? I answer unhesitatingly, all
necessary to their internal government. Generally, all not delegated by
them in the articles of confederation to the United States of America; all
not yielded by them under the Constitution of the United States." Justice
Catron merely finds these laws a tax on commerce, and Justice Grier concurs with him. Justice McKinley thinks that the question of immigration
and immigrants is solely in the hands of Congress.
2 5 Taney closes with a remarkable assertion of the rights of the general
government: "For all the great purposes for which the federal government
was founded we are one people with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States, and, as members of the same community, must
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption as freely as in our own states; and a tax imposed by a state for entering
its territories or harbors is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the
citizens of other states as members of the union, and with the object which
that union was instituted to attain. * * * But upon the question that the
record brings up the judgment in the New York case, as well as that in
Massachusetts, ought, in my opinion, to be affirmed." Justices Daniel, Nels·on and Woodbury agreed with the Chief Justice in his conclusion. Justice
Woodbury's opinion is of importance because he suggested the principle
adopted a few years later in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens (12
How. 299), that the power of Congress over commerce is exclusive only
when a uniform rule is necessary.
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Taney and Woodbury fully realized that 'the two powers, different
though they were, must conflict at times, and the only way to harmonize them was to make that of commerce supreme and paramount. This we have accepted, and we can only account for the
court's earlier action by remembering that the great sectional strife
was connected with these decisions and that the policy of the court
was one of mildness and temperance.
We have ,gone far enough to see that the development of the
police power leads into many different fields, that it is a power not
·to be enclosed within any narrow limits, but that it is a broad and
comprehensive power, e:i,,i:ending .into every phase of our jurisprudence. This makes it very difficult to treat of the police power in
any one phase, and to show how this police power in its development has affected the rights of states and citizens. But unless we
are to be completely lost in the labyrinth through which the police
power has gone it is necessary to discuss separately the relation of
the police power to those rights upon which it has had the most
influence. With this in view, I have undertaken to point out the
main effects of the police power on
The Obligation of Contract;
2. The Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
3. Race Legislation;
4. The Relation of Employer and Employee.
I.

It must not be thought that there are distinct barriers between
these different subjects. In many cases they overlap, but by treating of them separately we shall come to a clearer knowledge of the
growth of the police power and what it at present means.
RltLA'l'ION OF '!'HE POLICE POWER 'l'O '!'HE 0BLIGA'l'ION OF CON'l'RAC'l'

Chief Justice Marshall has had an immense influence on our country. His opinions in many cases stand today and are quoted with
the most profound respect. Perhaps no decision of his has had a
deeper influence on our law than that rendered in the Dartmouth
College Case. 26 It is unnecessary to take up either the facts or the
argument of this important contractual decision. The doctrine
advanced in the d~cision still stands, limited only by the police
power. The decision itself fastened upon us the doctrine of cor20

4 Wheat. 518.
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porate inviolapility, but Marshall's admission that the states are not
restrained in regulating their "civil institutions adopted for internal
government" has limited the above doctrine.
'rhe case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge21 marks the
first step in limiting the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case.
Here it was held that while a charter is binding yet it carries with
it no exclusive right beyond that expressly stated, and that in interpretation a charter is to be considered as carrying nothing by implication.
The first step taken by our courts in placing limits upon the
inviolability of contract by virtue of the police power was in the
case of Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co. 28 In this case the court
held that a state may legally add additional duties to those prescribed in a charter, provided these restrictions are made by virtue
of the police power. The coming of the war and the reconstruction put a stop to cases involving contractual rights, and it was not
until 1877 that we agaill meet an important contractual decision.
As we shall see, the court had become thoroughly familiar with the
doctrine and name of the police power, and from this time the conPet. 420.
Vt. 140 (1855). The question at issue was whether a state might
require railroads to fence their tracts and put cattle-guards at all crossings,
if such restrictions were made after a charter, which had no such provisions.
had been granted. The court found that control over railroads in this respect
existed in the state legislature by virtue of "the general control over the
police of the country." That this is "a responsibility of which the legislatures cannot divest themselves, if they would." The "police power of the
state" is found to extend "to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the
state"; that with regard to railroads "this police power, which resides primarily and ultimately in the legislature, is twofold": first, "the police of the
roads" exercised by the railroads themselves in absence of "legislative control"; second, "the general police power of the state, by which persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was or, upon
acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." And as the court had already shown that a railroad
company has no more rights than an individual, the same applies to railroad
companies. The court grants that a franchise is private property, and its
right of protection as such, but it is firm in refusing to adopt a construction
which would put corporate interests beyond legislative control.
21 II
28 27
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test between the inviolability of contract and the police power
becomes ?- deadly one.
Two cases decided in this year introduce the question whether or
not a state by granting charters, and thus establishing contractual
relations, can bargain away its police power. The case of Beer Co.
v. M assachusetts20 brought forward the liquor question again. The
company had been granted its franchise as a brewing company
years before, and when a prohibitory liquor law was passed it
claimed that the state was destroying its franchise by forbidding
the sale of its product in Massachusetts. The court decided that
the state, having reserved the right to alter or repeal the franchise,
might forbid the sale of the product; and further, that a state could
not bargain away its right to control liquor, the control of which
falls under the police power. The case of Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park 30 carried this principle into a new field. The company had
been granted a charter to locate and carry on business for fifty
years. Their land ;finally came within the village of Hyde Park,
and the village forbade the company to carry their materials through
the streets. This ordinance was upheld. The court pointed out
that there was no provision preventing such an ordinance, and had
there been one it would probably be void as an illegal limitation on
the police power.
The point in question was decided in Stone v. Mississippi. 31 The
state had granted a franchise to conduct a lottery for twenty-five
years, and for this she had been paid. Aftenvard a new constitu29

97

30

97

u. s. 25.
u. s. 659.

31 IOI U. S. 814. In rendering the decision in this case Chief Justice
Waite said: "The doctrines of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
announced by this court more than sixty years ago have become so imbedded
in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make them to all intents and
purposes a part of the Constitution itself." We can only reconcile this statement to the decision rendered here by remembering that the earlier case does
not refer to any act which could be based on the 'residual sovereignty'
residing in the states, and by remembering that Chief Justice Marshall really
prepared the way, though unknowingly, for the latter development, when
he said: "The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the
states in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed
is admitted."

I86
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tion had been adopted forbidding lotteries. The court quoted the
two previous cases and held that a state cannot be limited by such
a contract and that no contract of a state can limit the police power.32
Stone v. Mississippi did not survive without some limitations. The
old struggle was brought up again in r885 in the cases of New
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Co., and New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers. 33 In
the first two cases exclusive franchises for laying gas mains and
supplying gas to the city had been granted; in the last an exclusive
franchise was granted for supplying water. Had the court followed the precedent established in Stone v. Mississippi, the injunctions to prevent other people from laying the gas mains or water
pipes would not have been granted; but the injunctions were
granted on the basis that the first franchises were binding contracts.
It is conceded that the supply of light and water is included in the
'widest_ definition' of the police power. What then did the court
mean? How could these injunctions be granted when the court
had expressly stated that the police power could not be bargained
away? It is admitted that the supply of gas and water has relation to health and even to morals, but this connection is held to be
too slight to restrain the application of the Dartmouth College Case. 34
Under these decisions we have two kinds of police power: first,
that which is closely connected with the public health, safety, and
morals cannot be bargained away; second, that which has to do
with the general welfare can be alienated. A number of cases arose
to which this principle was applied. 35 The second point above was
3 2 The rule of Stone v. Mississippi was very emphatically upheld in the
case of Butchers Union Company v. Crescent City Company, III U. S. 746.
One legislature had granted an exclusive franchise to the Crescent City
Company; a few years later another legislature repealed this grant. In the
Slaughter-House cases the first act had been upheld; now the Supreme
Court upheld the second act. Slaughter-houses were judged to be fit objects
of legislative control, and the court held that a legislature could not be
bound by an exclusive franchise granted by a previous legislature.
33 II5 U. S. 650, 683, 674.
34 It seems as if the supply of water and gas would have as close a relation to public health and morals as butchering, but Justice Harlan says that
the original franchise in the Butchers Union Company case was upheld
merely as a police regulation, and as such it was repeatable.
3 5 New Orleans v. Houston, n9 U. S. 265.
The court decided that
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amended in the case of Honie Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles.36 The
telephone company had a franchise extending for a long period of
years. The city reduced the rates below those established by the
franchise. When the case reached the Supreme Court it was held
that the rates could be reduced because the franchise had been
granted for too long a time. In other words, that portion of the
police power which refers to the general welfare cannot be alienated
for too long a period, but no length of time was set, and it was but
a few years before the court came back to the principles of Stone
v. Mississippi.
This principle was reestablished in the case of Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Goldsboro. 37 The railroad company had been granted
certain rights by the city of Goldsboro, and these rights were later
withdrawn. In upholding this ordinance, Justice Pitney, speaking
for the court, said:
"For it is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the
'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power
of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably
while a state could not bargain away its right to abolish a lottery, it could
do away with its right to tax it, and that on the matter of taxation the rule
of Stone v. Mississippi did not apply. St. Tammany Water-Works Company v. New Orleans Water-Works, 120 U. S. 64. Gas and water companies may enjoin their franchises against any exercise of the police power.
To this extent the obligation of contract won over the police power. Otis
v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606. The court upheld a provision in the California
State Constitution making void all contracts for the sale of corporate stock
on margin or for future delivery, and authorizing a recovery of any money
paid on such contracts. "If the state thinks that an admitted evil cannot
be prevented by prohibiting a calling or transaction not in itself necessarily
objectionable, the courts cannot interfere, unless, in looking at the substance
of the matter, they can see that it is a clear, unmistakable infringement of
rights secured by fundamental law." Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S.
223. The facts of the case are similar to those of Fertilizing Company v.
Hyde Park, only here we have a gas company. The court held that the
city could not by virtue of the police power of the state attack the gas
company, but it said that the "right to exercise police power is a continuing
one, and a business lawful today may because of a changed situation become
a menace to public health and welfare and be required to yield to public
good." Here we have an intimation that the second point in the gas and
water cases will be changed.
36 2II U. S. z65.
37 232

u. s. 548.
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necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort,
or general welfare of the community; that this power can
neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable
even by express grant; and that all contract and property
rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
Words more sweeping have seldom been used. The only protection
that is left to vested rights is found in the court's review of the
reasonableness of legislation.
One more case is worthy of notice, that of Union Dry Goods Co.
v. Georgia Public Seri.dee Corporation. 88 The. service corporation
had contracted to supply light to the dry goods company for five
years. The rates were raised, and judged to be reasonable by the
State Railroad Commission. The Supreme Court sustained the
rates. After citing a number of cases, Justice Clarke said:
"These decisions, a fe\y from the mariy of like effect,
should suffice to satisfy the most skeptical and belated investigator that the right of private contract must yield to the
exigencies of the public welfare when determined in an
appropriate manner by the authority of the state."
The decisions mentioned cover roo years-at one end we have
the· Dartmouth College Case declaring for corporate inviolability;
at the other, the Union Dry Goods Case making the 'Obligation
of Contract' almost subservient to that vast state power, the Police
Power. The various acts by which the cited cases arose are not
materially different, the interpretation has changed. It would seem
that those who hold that the -Supret;t"Ie Court is, in the final analysis,
a law-making body are correct.
RELATION OF THE POLICE POWER 'l'O THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

During the War between the States there was _little development
of the subject of which we are treating. But immediately afterward the question of the status of the Southern States arose. The
Thirteenth Amendment had been passed in December, 1865. This
prohibited slavery or involuntary servitude except in case of punishment for crime.. The majority in Congress had become accustomed
38
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to the assertion of authority, and when they realized that they were
failing "to reap the results of the war," and that President Johnson
was following the plan of Lincoln in restoring the Southern States
to their constitutional status, the Civil Rights· Act of 1866 was
passed. This bill
"was a plain announcement to the Southern legislatures that,
as against their project of setting the freedmen apart as a
special class, with a status at law corresponding to their
status in fact, the North would insist on exact equality
between the races in civil status, regardless of any consideration of fact." 39
This bill was vetoed by the President, and then passed over his veto.
In order to assure it of constitutionality, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress, and in a most questionable fashion it
was ratified by the states. The first section of this amendment is the
one in which we are interested. 40
Before we take up the interpretation·of the Fourteenth Amendment with reference to the police power, a slight digression will
be helpful. Probably the· primary reason for the adoption of the
Constitution was a determination to guarantee the property right.
Most of the recent cases involving this right of ownership have
arisen under the Fourteenth Amendment, but there was one early
state decision worthy of note.
The state courts were late in adopting the term police power;
they held to the old common law doctrines. The second state decision in which the term police power was used 1s Commonwealth v.
Alger.41 This case, Hastings says,
"furnishes a starting point for citations directly relating to
the police power in most of the constitutional discussions
that embrace the subject." 42
39 DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND EcoNOMIC,

p. 63.

The first section reads as follows: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of Citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, libercy or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
41 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53 ( I851).
~2 HASTINGS, siipra, p. 418.
40
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The question referred to the relationship of private real estate and
general welfare. A law had been passed by Massachusetts which
forbade the erection or placing of any materials for a wharf in
Boston harbor. The defendant had been found guilty of violating
this provision, and he brought the case before the supreme court
of the state, and argued that the wharf was on his land and would
not interfere with the right of way of ships. Justice Shaw decided
that the law was a valid exercise of the police power, and in this
connection he said:
"We think it is a settled principle, grmving out of the
nature of well-ordered society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
* * * The power we allude to is rather the police power,
the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution, to
make * * * laws * * * not repugnant to the Constitution as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same." 43
We now return to the Fourteenth Amendment. The judges were
sympathetic with the results of the war in so far as they established the principles of territorial sovereignty, but they were not
ready to see the states become powerless and the whole theory of
our Constitution destroyed. Fortunate indeed were we in having
such a man as Justice Miller, who in a time of great national disturbance was able to foresee the inherent danger of this new amendment, and who had the courage to place himself in the path of radicalism and check it.
The first cases to arise under the amendment were the SlaitghterH oitse Cases.44 The State of Louisiana had created a corporation,
the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Com43 Again he says: "But he is restrained, not because the public have
occasion to make like use or any use of the property, or to take any benefit
or profit to themselves from it, buf because it would be a noxious use con•
trary to the maxim, 'Sic utere tieo, 1tt alie1mm 1101i laedas.'"
44 16 Wall. 18.
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pany, to which it granted a monopoly within New Orleans of the
landing and slaughtering of animals for food. The company could
permit any other person 'to kill animals in their slaughter-houses,
and a maximum charge was set. The butchers of New Orleans
contended that the law "abridged" their "privileges and immunities" as "citizens of the United States." This law was upheld by
a bare majority of one, Justice Miller rendering the decision. Justice Miller says that the amendment might be so construed as to
leave the states the "mere shell of legislative power." He then
reviews the history of the adoption of the reconstruction amendments. Ne..'Ct he turns to the really important point. He decided
that there is a line between state citizenship and national citizenship; that the Fourteenth Amendment gave no added protection
to the citizens of the states as such.
"Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states that
whatsoever those rights as you grant or establish them for
your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose
restrictions on their exercise, the same neither more nor less
shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states
within your jurisdiction."
This simply extended to the citizens of the United States the protection given to citizens of the other states as contained in Article
4, Section 2, Clause I, of the Constitution.45
The real point here was, granting that this law establishes a
monopoly which violates common right, does the Supreme Court
under the Fourteenth Amendment have authority to deal with it,
and is such state action forbidden by the amendment? The majority
answered this question in the negative.46 This decision rendered
valueless the 'privileges and immunities' clause in extending the
4G This clause reads as follows:
"The citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
4 6 The dissenting judges undoubtedly interpreted this amendment as the
framers of it had intended. It was passed in order to prevent a state from
passing any hostile legislation toward any class. Justice Field's dissenting
opinion is strong and follows this idea. He argued that the amendment
protected the rights of all citizens of the state by virtue of their being citizens of the United States. Had this principle been adopted, and a broad
construction rendered, the police power of the state would have been
destroyed. The court seems to have remembered Madison's statement that
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national power at the expense of that of the states.47 As a result,
attention was turned to the other provisions, and in interpreting
these the Supreme Court has not been slothful in allowing room
for the police power.
The attention of the court was now turned to the question of the
legality of a state regulating the rates of railroads and private businesses. In this field we meet the most important development of
the police power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before taking
up the main cases on this point it will be well to mention two cases
that arose soon after the Slaughter-House decisions. In Railroad
Co. v. Fuller,4 8 the court"held that it was not illegal for a state to
require a railroad to post its rates once a year and to force the railroad to abide by them. Such legislation is a valid exercise of the
police power.40 And in Railroad, Co. v. Maryland 50 the court decided
that the state, in granting a franchise to the Baltimore & Ohio to
construct a branch from Baltimore to Washington, had the power
to say what rate could be charged, and furthermore the state could
require a_ certain per cent of the passenger charges to be paid to it,
for the railroads are the work of people who receive their authorization from the state.51 Justice Bradley always held that regulation
"if they (the states) were abolished, the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper
jurisdiction." FEDERALIST, No. 14-•
47 In the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, the principle of the
Slaughter-House cases was upheld. The defendant had been convicted of
selling liquor. He appealed the case and argued that he had owned the liquor
prior to the date when selling was made illegal, and that as a citizen of the
United States he was deprived of his 'privileges and immunities' as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Miller gave the decision, and he again
made the distinction between state and national citizenship, declaring that
the conviction was warranted.
48 17 Wall. 56o.
49 In this connection Judge Swayne said: "It is not in the sense of the
Constitution in any wise a regulation of commerce. It is a public regulation,
and as such forms a portion of the 'immense mass of legislation which
embraces everything within the territory of the state and not surrendered
to the general government,' all which can be most advantageously exercised
by the states themselves." He admits that there is concurrent power which
when exercised by the states must be called "police power,'' and when exercised by Congress "commercial power."
50 21 Wall. 456, 470.
51 With regard to the state charging a certain per cent, Justice Bradley
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of such rates was a question for the states, and that the reasonableness of the rates was a matter for the legislature to decide. We
shall see this doctrine modified.
The case upon which our state rate regulation is based is Munn
v. Illinois.r. 2 The question at issue here was whether or not the
state legislature might regulate the maximum charges for storage
of grain in cities. It was argued that such a law deprived the owners
of their property and denied to them 'the equal protection of the
laws.' This case is of particular interest because in it Chief Justice
Waite gives to the police power an historical definition. He argued
that the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment are as old Magna.
Charta and form a part of all state constitutions; that the state
legislatures possess the supremacy of Parliament in so far as they
are not limited by the Constitution, and such regulations are not
within the limitations. Two main principles were laid down in this
case: the legislature of a state may, through its police power, regulate the charges of a business affecting public interest; and the question of the reasonableness of these rates is one for the legislature
to decide. This leaves to the Supreme Court the question of whether
the business is public in nature. 53
We have noticed how in the early railroad cases the police power
was adjudged not to violate the commerce clause. This victory was
not of long duration. In 1886 the case of Wabash, St. Louis & P.
says: "It has discretion as to the amount of that compensation; that discretion is a legislative, a sovereign discretion, and in its very nature is
unrestricted and uncontrolled."
r. 2 94 U. S. IIJ.
r.a The other Granger cases were decided on the same principles. In
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, a law establishing maximum rates was upheld. The law was resisted as impairing the
contract in the charter, and for the reasons urged in Munn v. Illinois. Since
no immunity was given in the charter, the court decided that no immunity
could be implied. The .court further said : "This road, like the warehouse
in that case [Munn v. Illinois], is situated within the limits of a single state.
Its business is carried on there and its regulation is a matter of domestic
concern. It is employed in state as well as in interstate commerce, and until
Congress acts the state must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people within its own jurisdiction, even though in so doing those without
may be indirectly affected."
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Ry. Co. v. Illinois5 4 came before the court, and in the decision we
find the first shift from the position adopted in the earlier cases.
Here it was decided that no state could regulate the charges of
transportation of goods taken beyond the state, and that they could
not even regulate the charges for the distance carried in the state.55
In the case of Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County 56 it was
held that the only way in which a state can act on interstate commerce is through its police power. But this does not extend to the
laying of a tax with the view of preventing anyone from exercising
his right of engaging in interstate commerce.
The victory of commerce over police power went still ftirther.
In the case of Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.51 the court
held that a state's police power·did not extend to the point of interference with the right of a man in another state to ship liquor into
the state. The fact that Congress had not regulated this subject
was judged to mean that Congress had meant it to go unregulated,
and unregulated it should go until Congress acted. And in Kidd v.
Pearson, 58 although the same law was involved, the court held that
the police power extended to the prevention of manufacturing of
liquor within its own borders, although such liquor was to be sent
to another state and there sold. There seems to be a strange inconsistency here, for in the second case police power applies to the regulation of that which in no way could harm the citizens of the state,
while in the first case it does not apply to that which might easily
harm them. The explanation lies in the paramount authority of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.59
u8 U. S. 557.
An extension of this principle is found in the Shreveport Rate Case,
234 U. S. 342, where it was held that a railroad cannot charge lower rates
per mile in a state than it does for interstate business, even though interstate rates have been decided reasonable, and intrastate rates are fixed by
the State Commerce Commission.
56 I20 U. S. 489.
57 I25 U. S. 465.
54

55

58

I28

U. S.

I.

Just preceding these cases the Supreme Court had decided the case of
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. Here a state law requiring an engineer
to be examined and procure a license before he drove a locomotive within
the state was upheld. Smith had violated this law, and he was engaged in
interstate commerce alone; nevertheless, the law was judged to apply. The
59
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The case of M1tgler v. Kansas60 really ended the fight of the liquor
men against prohibitory state legislation. Here the court went to
great length in showing the bad effect of liquor, and it decided that
when the value of property was injured through a lawful exercise
of the police power the damage was merely consequential. Two
propositions were made clear: (r) that by the Fourteenth Amendcourt said: "There are many cases where the acknowledged powers of a
state may be exerted and applied in such a manner as to affect foreign or
interstate commerce without being intended to operate as commercial regulations. If their operation in such cases regulate such commerce so as to
conflict with the regulation of the same subject by Congress, either as
expressed by positive laws or implied from the absence of legislation, such
legislation on the part of the state to the e..-.;:tent of such conflict must be
regarded as annulled." It would seem evident that in a case of this nature
the law in question refers to a condition where public safety. is endangered,
and that when this is the case a state may pass restrictions which affect
interstate commerce. The court upheld the decision of Bowman v. Railroad
Co. in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, and to it they applied Brown v. Maryland, holding that the right to import involves the right to sell. Rahrer Case,
140 U. S. 545. Rahrer, as an agent, had sold liquor shipped from another
state in the original package. Just before this the "Wilson Bill" had been
passed. This bill provided that liquors from other states should be subject
on arrival to the operation of the laws of the state into which they had been
shipped. In speaking of the police power, Justice Fuller said that it is "The
power to impose restraints and burdens upon persons and property in the
conservation and promotion of public health, good order and prosperity. It
belonged originally to the states, has never been surrendered to the government nor directly restrained, and is essentially exclusive. * * * In short, it
is not to be doubted that the power to make the ordinary regulations of
police remains with the individual states and cannot be assumed by the
national government, and in this respect it is not interfered with by the
Fourteenth Amendment." He finds the commercial power exclusive "when
the subjects of that power are national in their nature." Later he says: "If
a law passed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged powers comes
into conflict with that will, Congress and the state cannot occupy the position of equal opposing sovereignties, because the Constitution declares its
supremacy." If it is exclusive, the police power does not enter the sphere
of congressional supremacy, but in allowing for this conflict, after having
stated that the police power is exclusive, the court contradicts itself, and
really makes the police power subject to the federal government. In the
case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 3II,
the court held that a state might forbid all shipments of intoxicating liquors,
and upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act of March l, 1913, providing for this,
whether the liquor was in the original package or not.
00
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ment a state had lost none of its police power; ( 2) prohibiting or
otherwise regulating liquor in the state is a valid exercise of the
police power.61
The Granger Cases decided that where rates were set by the legislature there was no question for judicial review. 62 The overthrow
of this proposition took place as follows : The State of Minnesota
established a railroad commission to regulate rates of transportation.
This commission was to hav.e sole charge of the reasonableness of
the rates. A case arose under this act and the railroad argued that
the rates as set by the Commission were an unconstitutional deprivation of property. In this case, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 63 the court held itself bound by; the state court's decision
that rates set by the commission were final if the law was valid,
but the court held, in reversing the decision, that in such a case the
reasonableness of rates is a question for judicial review, and this
question couid be appealed on the ground that the question was one
of law and not one of fact. 64
In the case of Reagen. v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.65 we again
have rates set by a commission, but the· court decided that whether
the rates were set by commission or not, the subject of reasonableness of rates is a question for judicial review. The court having
,decided to review such legislation, which up to this point refers to
The court in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, upheld a law prohibiting the making or sale of oleomargarine colored to imitate butter.
6 2 This principle was adhered to in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517.
63 134 u. s. 418, 462.
64 The court said: "It deprives the company of its rights to an investigation by due process of law. * * *' The question of reasonableness of a rate
of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does
the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards
the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due
process of law for its determination." This review of reasonableness seems
to be confined to the fLxing of rates, for in the case of New York & N. E.
Ry. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, the c~urt upheld a law authorizing a railroad commission to require, under certain conditions, grade crossings to be
removed and replaced. The court seems to indicate that it will refuse to
look into the reasonableness of a police act which has been affirmed by the
state courts, when the provisions of the act are confined to health, safety
and morals. Here we see a similarity to the rule advanced in New Orleans
Water-Work Co. v. Rivers.
·
65 154
·362.
61

u. s.
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intrastate commerce, had to determine what a reasonable rate is.
This was done in Snz.'.yth v. Ames.66 This case overturned Mmm v.
Illinois so far as it refers to railroads, for a railroad business is an
object of public interest, and as it has to serve the public on fair
terms, railroad property is quasi-public property. The court will
see to it that no rates are set so low as to prevent a fair return, for
othenvise confiscation would take place. A fair return is the current rate of interest on the value of property that is used for the
public. 67
It might be well to complete here the discussion of the legality of
a state fixing railroad rates. Smyth v. Ames provided for some
separation between intrastate and interstate commerce. The difficulties iri the way of such a separation led the court to suggest in the
ll1innesota· Rate Cases6 8 that the two were so blended as perhaps to
make it necessary for Congress to regulate both in order to have
effective regulation, but that in absence of congressional action the
states were free to set maximum intrastate rates for interstate carriers. Furthermore, in this case a reasonable rate was described as
one which gives a fair return on the value of the property, and
such value includes the current rate of interest on the value of a
going concern, less deterioration. The Shreveport Rate Case69
decided positively that in regulating interstate commerce Congress,
through the Interstate Commerce Commission, could regulate any
169 u. s. 466.
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it
for the convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in .Permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning
capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case.
We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to ask is a
fair return upon the value which it employs for the public convenience. On
the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be
exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered
are reasonably worth."
66
67

68 230
69

234
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u. s. 342.
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intrastate rates which were discriminatory. From this we are able
to see that when commerce enters the field the police power leaves.
With regard to railroads, Mitnn v. Illinois is overturned, but -with
regard to other businesses only the provision that the reasonableness
of such regulations is not subject to judicial review has been overturned.
The court has repeatedly held that a legislature has wide discretion in classifying objects with which it may interfere on the
grounds of preserving the- public health, safety and morals. 70 A
state may pick out the business which it will regulate. Regulations
have been passed affecting the milk business,71 requiring a railroad
company to move the foundation of a bridge so as to widen the
channel,72 requiring all physicians to register,73 forbidding burial
of dead within city limits ;74 making a telegraph company liable for
damages suffered by a sender if his telegram is not delivered ;75 fix70 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133· "Whenever the public interest demands
it, and in this particular a large discretion is vested in the legislature to
determine not only what the interests of the public require but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."
71 N. Y. ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552. In upholding
this regulation affecting the milk business, Justice Day said: "Nor do we
think there is force in the contention that the plaintiff in error has been
denied the equal protection of the laws because of the allegation that the
milk business is the only business dealing in foods which is thus regulated
by the sanitary code. * * * It is primarily for the state to select the kinds
of business which shall be subjects of regulation, and if the business affected
is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid
objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of
a different kind."
72 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561.
'13 Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173·
"Police power of the states
extends to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those
which closely concern public health. * * * Classification of the subjects of
such legislation, so long as such classification h'as a reasonable basis and: is
not merely arbitrary selection without real difference between the subjects
included and those omitted from the law, does not deny to the citizens the
equal protection of the laws,'' citing Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79,
which upheld a law prohibiting a certain class of drumming or soliciting of
business on trains.
74 Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216 U.
358.
7 5 W estem Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.
4o6.

s.
s.
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ing maximum rates of interest ;76 requiring every state bank to
contribute to bank depositors' guaranty fund;77 requiring two feet
of space on outside of rails of coal mines ;78 fixing weight of stand. ard loaf of bread.79
These are but a few of many specific regulations placed by the
state on private business affecting public interest, all of them upheld
by the Supreme Court as coming within the police power of the
state. In the case of the German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis8°
the court went even further. Here it was decided that a business
may be so far affected with a public interest as to permit legislative
regulation of its rates and charges, although no public trust is
imposed upon the property and although the public may not have
a legal right to demand and receive service, and that the business
of fire insurance is so far affected with a public interest as to
justify legislative regulation of its rates.
One of the main restrictions on the state in the exercise of this
power is the definition of liberty given by the Supreme Court in
the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana.81 Liberty is broadly defined as
"not only the right of the citizen to be free from mere physical restraint of his person, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment
of his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways,
to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper or necessary and essential for his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.''
Even this liberty may at times be trampled on; for instance, it does
not prevent a man from being vaccinated against his will. 82
1a Griffith v. State of Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563.

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26.
79 Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578.

11
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u. s. 389.

81165 u. s. 578.
82 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II. The court cites Hannibal &
St. J. Ry. Co. v. Rusen, 95 U. S. 465, and Thorpe v. Rutland, 27 Vt. 140:
"Persons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state; of
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With regard to monopolies the court has decided that a state may
not regulate a business on the basis that while a perfectly reason·able charge is made so far as value of services rendered is concerned, yet if the business grows large profits from the charges
may be cut. A state may regulate the business as a whole, but it
cannot distinguish between a large and a small business.83
There is one other point of importance which must be touched
upon. By Eubank v. Richmond84 it was decided that the police
power does not extend to resthetic considerations. 85 But in a very
recent decision86 the court seems inclined to broaden the police
power to cover this field if policy can be found to support it. 87
From this discussion two or three points seem evident. It is
clear that the court is very jealous of the congressional power over
interstate commerce, but it is equally evident that even though interstate commerce prevails as against the police power, the court has
looked upon the police power very favorably when other businesses
are to be regulated.
the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was or
upon acknowledged general principles ever can be made, so far as natural
persons are concerned."
83 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79.
A· general
rule for the regulation of monopolies on th~ part of the state was laid down
in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. In this case it was decided
that a state legislature may provide their own methods of procedure and
determine the methods and means by which their legislation may be made
effective, subject only to the qualifications that this procedure must not work
a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict specifically with provisions of the
Federal Constitution. The fixing of fines, so long as they are not grossly
excessive, is also within the police power of the state.
84 226 u. s. 137.
85 "JEsthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather
than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of
the police power to take private property without compensation."
86 St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269.
87 Justice Holmes, in upholding a law regulating billboards, said: "It
is true that according to the bill the plaintiff has done away with dangers
from fire and wind, but apart from the question whether those dangers d:o
not remain sufficient, they are or may be the least of the objections adverted
to in the cases." This seems to indicate a tendency to broaden police power
to resthetic purposes if policy can be found to support it. "Possibly one or
two details * * * have resthetic conditions in view more than anything else.
But as the main burdens stand on other grounds," etc.

POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

Tn

201

PoLici;: Powi;:R AND R.Aci;: LE:GISLA'l'ION

Anyone who is at all familiar with the history of the War between
the States and Reconstruction realizes that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were passed in order to establish
the politiCal equality of the negroes. The amendments have been
of great importance in other respects, but so far as they have been
used with reference to negro legislation they have primarily affected
the South, against which they were directed. It has been very fortunate for that section that the Supreme Court has given the police
power such a wide range, and due to this power the South has so .
far been able to ward off the danger arising from her large negro
population.
Cases affecting the negroes were much more numerous forty
years ago than today, and the court thought then that few cases
which did not refer to negro legislation88 would come before them
under the amendments. This was a mistaken idea, for because of
such legislation many interesting and important cases have come
before the court. The court has, as I have said, made liberal allowance for this legislation. Perhaps no case shows this more clearly
than United States v. Reese.89 Here an act of Congress fixing punishment for ·hindering voting under the Fifteenth Amendment was
declared unconstitutional because it did not distinguish between
discrimination on account of color and other -discrimination. The
court stated that the power of Congress to act on this subject
extended only to race discrimination.
The same principle won in the case of United States v. Cruikshank.90 Here the defendants were charged with having violated
a federal law that no people should intimidate others so as to hinder
them in the exercise of their rights. The defendants were brought
before the court on thirty-two counts-preventing persons from
bearing arms, depriving them of liberty, etc. The court achnitted
ss In the Slaughter-House cases, Judge Miller said: "We doubt very
much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination
against the negro as a class or on account of their race will ever be held
to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision
for that race and that emergency that a strong case will be necessary for
its application to any other."
s9 92 U. S. 214
90 92 u. s. 542.
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that for some offenses a man might be amenable to both nation and
state, but the offenses as charged were waived aside on the ground
that the protection of the citizens of a state rests with the state,
that discrimination on account of race was not shown, and that the
proof was too vague to allow conviction.
In Hall v. DeCuir91 we find the beginning of the decisions by
which separate travel accommodations for the races has been
upheld. Louisiana had enacted a law that no one should be refused
admission to or expelled from a public conveyance because of race.
Mrs. DeCuir was refused admission to cabins reserved for white
ladies, .and for this she sued the owner of the steamboat. The
court decided that such a law was an interference with the power
of Congress over interstate commerce, and as such there was no
ground for suit. 92
With regard to jury service we have three interesting cases. In
Strauder v. West Virginia 93 it was decided that a man convicted
under a discriminatory jury law is denied the "equal protection of
the law." In Virginia -:1· Rives94 it was held that a person is not
entitled to trial by a jury composed in part of his own race. Judge
Field's concurring opinion is of importance, for it foretold the downfall of the civil rights legislation by Congress. He held that an
act of Congress attempting to give the United States courts jurisdiction to enforce state laws is unconstitutional. In Ex parte Virg£nia95 an act of Congress providing that an officer who discriminat°ely selects jurors should be fined was held to be unconstitutional
on the basis that it interfered with the purely local concerns of a
state.
The Civil Rights Cases96 completed the overthrow of the Second
Civil Rights Bill. Two of these cases arose because colored per95 u. s. 485.
Chief Justice Waite said: "But we think it may be safely said that
- state legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our
opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon business through local
instruments to be employed after coming within the state, but directly upon
the business as it comes into or goes out from within."
93 IOO U. 8. 303.
91

02

IOO U. 8. 3I3.
U. S. 339·
96 !09
3.
94

95 IOO

u. s.
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sons were refused hotel accommodations ;97 two, because negroes
were refused accommodations in theatres ;98 and the fifth, because
a negro woman was refused the privilege of riding in the ladies'
car.99 The court decided that in none of these cases was there
ground for action, because the three amendments were prohibitions
on states and not on individuals.100
In the Ku Klux Cases101 the court decided that the amendments
conferred no right of suffrage. Congress, however, could still guard
against discrimination and protect people from such discrimination.102
In Plessy v. Ferguson1 Q3 the court upheld a law requiring separate
coaches for white and colored passengers, saying that the Four·
teenth Amendment could not "enforce social equality or a commingling of the two races on terms unsatisfactory to either." Th~
test of such a law is reasonableness, and with regard to this th~
legislature has wide powers. In such a test the customs of the
people have much to do with the decision.104 Such. a law, so long
as equal accommodations are given, does not place one race in an
U. S. v. Stanley and U. S. v. Nichols, 109 U. S. 3.
U. S. v. Ryan and U. S. v. Singleton, 109 U. S. 3.
99 Robinson and Wife v. Memphis, etc., .Ry. Co., 109 U. S. 3.
1 0° Justice Bradley in rendering the decision said: "It does not authorize
Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private
rights, but to provide a mode of redress against the operation of state laws
and the action of state officers, executive and judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights s~ified in the amendment." The reason
for such a broad view being taken at this time may be found in the fact that
the democrats had just returned to power, and no longer was there danger
of anti-southern legislation on the part of Congress.
101 IIO U. S. 651.
102 These cases followed Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178, where
it was decided that the amendments did not give women the right to vote.
1 0 3 163 U. S. 537. The Supreme Court has held closely to the doctrine
of this case. The most recent decision is Cincinnati, Covington & E. St. Ry.
Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 408.
1o4 The court said: "So far as conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment
is concerned the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of
Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must
necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to
the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view
to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of public peace and
good order."
97

98
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inferior position.1>:> 5 The case of Chiles v. C. & 0. Ry. Co.1 >:> 0
extended the above principles. Here it was decided that in abi;ence
of statutory authority a carrier may lawfully separate the races
even in interstate transportation, and that if general sentiment supports a law it cannot be considered unreasonable.101
The court seems to make a distinction between the r!ghts which
tl).e police power may affect. ·'Jim Crow' legislation has been
upheld because it is not discriminatory; but segregation ord?nancec;,
although general sentiment certainly supports them, are illegal, and
as the Constitution supports the right to "acquire, use, and Jispoc;e
of" property, a city ordinance preventing a negro from living in a
block where the majority of the people are white is unconstitutional
as a violation of the clause that no "person shall be <leprived of
property without due process of law."108 It is evident that at present the court will uphold legislation of a racial character so long as
it is not perfectly clear that the legislation does not expressly vio.:
late some constitutional provision.
'Legislation regarding aliens has been put on the same basis.
Where there is no distinct violation of a constitutional provision the
lQ 5 In Berea College v: Commonwealth, 2II U. S. 45, it was decided, on
the grounds of Plessy v. Ferguson, that a state might prohibit private schools
and colleges from teaching the two races at the same time and place.
lQS

218

u. s.

71.

''Regulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the community for whom they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be
said to be unreasonable."
lQB Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. ~- The court said that the exercise
of the police power "is not to be interfered with by the courts where it is
within the scope of legislative authority and the means adopted reasonably
tend to accomplish a lawful purpose. But it is equally well established that the
police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance
which runs counter to the limitations of the Federal Constitution." The
court quotes Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, where, in speaking of Plessy v.
Ferguson and Berea College v. Commonwealth, it was said: ''In each
instance the complaining person was afforded the opportunity to ride, or to
attend institutions of learning, or afforded the things of whatever nature to
which in the particular case he was entitled. The most that was done was
to require him, as a member of a class, to conform with reasonable rules in
regard to the separation of the races. In none of them was he denied the
right to use, control or dispose of his property, as in this case. Property
of a person, whether as a member of a class or as an individual, cannot be.
taken· without due process of law."
1QT
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states may legislate on the subject by virtue of their police power.
In Chy Lmzg v. Freenzan100 the court had before it a law of Cali- ·
fornia requiring that certain classes of foreigners, among them lewd
women, should give bond on arrival to indemnify the state against
liability for their support for two years. The court finds that
America would stand no such action on the part of other countries,
and that the control of such a subject lies with Congress; but that
in absence of congressional action a state may protect itself in case
of great emergency.110 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins111 the court held
that a law requiring that no one should carry on a laundry business
without permission was invalid. The court reached this conclusion,
not because of anything inherently unconstitutional in the law, but
because the board that gave licenses had for no legal reason with- .
held them from all Chinese applicants, and the court held that when
such a law is administered in an unequal and oppressive fashion a
denial of equal justice as protected by the Constitution take~ place.
In Patsone v. Pennsylvania112 the court held that an act making it
unlawful for any alien to own a shotgun or rifle was constitutional.
This law made it unlawful for any alien to kill any wild bird or .
animal except in defense of person or property, and was upheld on
the ground that a state has wide powers of classification and may
. pass acts against that class from whom the evil is mainly to be
feared.
The last case which I shall mention in this connection is Trtea%
v. Raicli,113 where the court declared a law, which happens to have
been passed by the initiative and referendum, requiring employers
of more than five persons to engage no more than 20 per cent aliens
unconstitutional as denying to them as a class the equal protection
of the laws.
·
In both negro and alien legislation an important consideration is

u. s. 276.
"Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise
and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a state
statute limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that subject alone
· shall in proper controversy come before us, it will be time enough to decide
that question."
111 u8 U. S. 356.
109
11 0

92

112 232

113

239

u. s.

138.

u. s. 33.
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whether the law represents preponderant public opm10n and is a
necessary exercise of the police power. But in either case if the
law is a violation of some constitutional clause it does not stand.
THI~ POLICE POWER AND THE RELATION OF EMPLOYER

AND EMPLOYEE

We come now to the newest development of the police power.
Because of the conditions at the time, the police power early in its
history was bound up with the slavery question. After the war it
was primarily called up in cases of rate and negro legislation. At
the present time trade unionism and other labor problems occupy
the center of the stage, and that most useful power, the police power,
ha~ been called upon to unravel the difficulty.
The case of Barbier v. Connolly, 114 while it does not refer to the
relation of employer and employee serves as a basis for many of
the later decisions. Here a law prohibiting washing in public laundries from ten P. M. to six A. M. was upheld on the ground that this
law was a valid exercise of the police power in that it was passed
for purposes of health and safety. 115 The police power has had the
effect of limiting the freedom of both employer and employee
on the ground that an employee does not stand on an equal
basis with the employer in bargaining for conditions of work, and
that such regulation of their relations as promotes public health,
safety and morals is constitutional. Up to 1898 we had decisions
enforcing restrictions against producers in behalf of consumers, but
from then on the health of the producer becomes a matter of public
interest. Thus was liberty in making a contract restricted. In this
year the case of Holden v. Hardy116 came before the court, and in
rendering a decision the court came to the conclusion that an eightII3 U. S. 27.
"But neither the amendment (Fourteenth), broad and comprehensive
as it is, nor any other amendment was designed to interfere with the power
of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities·
of society, legislation of a special chara,cter having in view these objects
must often be had in a certain district, such as draining marshes and irrigating arid plains; special burdens are often necessary for general benefits."
114

11G

116 16g

u. s. 366.
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hour law for miners was constitutional as being a measure for the
promotion of health, for while in ordinary employment men might
work a longer time, yet in such occupations as mining a man cannot work for long hours without injury.117 The court, however, felt
it necessary to explain that it took this action because of new conditions.11s
In order to protect the employee the court in the case of St. Louis,
Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Paitl,1 19 upheld a law requiring railroads
111 "If it be within the power of the legislature to adopt such means
(ventilation, etc.) for the protection of the lives of its citizens, it is difficult
to see why precaution may not also be adopted for the protection of their
health and morals. It is as much for the interest of the state that public
health should be preserved as that life should be made secure. * * * While
the general experience of mankind may justify us in believing that men may
engage in ordinary employments more than eight hours per day without
injury to health, it does not follow that labor of the same length of time
is innocuous when carried on beneath the surface of the earth, where the
operative is deprived of fresh air and sunlight, and is frequently subjected
to foul atmosphere and a very high temperature, or to the influence of noxious gases generated by the process of refining and smelting."
11s In this connection the court said : "This court has not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science;
that in some of the states methods of procedure which, at the time the constitution was adopted, were deemed essential to the protection and safety
of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no
longer necessary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the
conduct of individuals, or of classes of individuals, have proved detrimental
to their interests, while, upon the other hand, certain other classes of persons have been found to be in need of additional protection. '~ * '~ It is
impossible to forecast the character or extent of these changes; but in view
of the fact that, from the day Magna Charta was signed to the present
moment, amendments to the structure of the law have been made with
increasing frequency, it is impossible to suppose that they will not continue,
and the law be forced to adopt itself to new conditions of society, and particularly to the new relations between employers and employees, as they arise."
11 9 173 U. S. 404 This idea of protecting the employee through the police
power has· extended to other employments in the matter of wages, until a
state can make very nearly what rate regulation it pleases. In Mutual Loan
Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, the court decided that a law invalidating the
assignment of future wages without consent of the wage-earner's wife and
employer did not deprive the man of due process of law. In Rail and River
Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, it was held that a law under which coal
miners, who are paid on the basis of weight, mus.t be paid according to all
coal contained in the mine car in which it has been removed from the mine,
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to pay at contract rates a discharged employee on the day of his discharge. _ This decision was based on the fact that railroads, being
clothed with a public trust, are under obligations to discharge duties
which affect the public at large, and that in furtherance of public
interest state legislatures might make laws for the benefit of
employees, even though such laws limited the right of freedom of
contract.
In Atkin v. Kansas120 a law establishing an eight-hour day for
both direct and contract work in public employments was upheld
on the ground that a state can prescribe conditions of work done
for it or for its municipalities. 121 Similar decisions have been given
with regard to restriction of hours of railroad employees, for the
railroad business affects public safety.122 If legislation of this kind
· made by a state conflicts with that made by Congress, the state legislation falls. 123 The upholding of the Adamson law124 was based
by the court on the principle that the law was an extension of hour
legislation to all interstate railroad employees. The regulation of
Congress naturally e.'Ctends only to those employed in interstate
commerce and to those employed by the government.
While a state might regulate hours of work in non-dangerous
provided no greater per cent of dfrt, etc., shall be contained than is avoidable, and providing that the system of docking is not done away with, does
not violate the right to enter into contract. In McLean v. Arkansas, 2II U.
S. 539, it was decided that a legislature may prescribe particular methods of
compensation. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549: By
police power reasonable restraints may be placed on the freedom of contract.
120 191 u. s. 207.
1 21 "It belongs to the state, as guardian and trustee for its people, and
having control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which it will
permit work to be done on its behalf or on behalf of its municipalities."
122 B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612:
"In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employees and travelers,
Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical
appliances, but it was also competent to consider and to _endeavor to reduce
the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of
engineers," etc.
1 2a Erie Ry. Co. v. N. Y., 233 U. S. 671: ''Where there is a conflict the
state legislation must give way. Indeed, when Congress acts in such a way
as to manifest its purpose to exercise its constitutional authority the regulating power of the state ceases to exist."
- 124 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332.

POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

public employments, the court did not at once come to the conclusion that it could do so in private employments. In Lochner v.
New York 125 the court held that a law restricting hours of work
in a bakery was t,tnconstitutional. This case differs from Holden v.
Hardy in that here there is no hazardous employment. The burden
of proof is placed on the state in defending a law which affects
liberty as defined in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. The police power could
be called upon to support only a law referring to public health,
safety and morals. But in the case of Bunting v. Oregon126 the
Lochner case, except for unusual violations of liberty, was overthrown. Here a law limiting men's hours of work to ten hours a
day in general factory work was upheld. The court had to be convinced that such a law was supported by general public opinion
and that it was for the general welfare of the community. So a
state may now bring forward police power, including general welfare, in support of its hours of work legislation.
The court has been more liberal in enforcing laws regulating
·hours of work of women, and here they have taken into consideration that in the case of women long hours are likely to prove
very detrimental. In Muller v. Oregon127 a ten-hour law for women
working in mechanical establishments, factories or laundries was
upheld as being a health measure. 128 In Miller v. Wilson 129 this
principle was adhered to and a law forbidding women to work
more than eight hours a day in hotels was upheld, despite the plea
of class legislation and discrimination. The court, however, admitted that such legislation might go beyond the bounds of reason, but
they held this to be a reasonable regulation. Thus, we see that the
right to enter freely into a contract has been restricted throug!i the
125

u. s.

198
45.
243 u. s. ¢.
127 2o8 u. s. 412.
128 "As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order
to preserve the strength and vigor of the race. * * * The limitation which
this statute imposes upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree
with her employer as to the time when she shall labor, are not imposed solely
for her benefit, but also for tpe benefit of all."
126

129 236

u. s. 373.
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police power of the state on the ground that a state must protect its
citizens who are employed.
It has become established that an employer may not be prevented
from discharging a man because of union membership. The question first came up in Adair v. United States. 130 An act of Congress
declaring that no man engaged in interstate commerce might be discharged because of union membership was held to be unconstitutional because violating liberty as protected by the Constitution. A
state law of the same nature was held to be unconstitutional in the
case of Coppage v. Kansas. 131 The court has also held that where
a man has signed an agreement stating that he will not join a union
all efforts made to persuade him to join are illegal.132
The most recent development of legislation by virtue of the police
power is found in the various compensation and employer's liability
acts. Maryland adopted the first of these acts in 1902, and two
years later it was declared unconstitutional by the state court.133
The first general law was enacted by New York in r9ro. This law
provided for compulsory compensation in certain hazardous employments. In the case of Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. 134 the constitutionality of the law was tested in the state court. The court held,
as did the United States Supreme Court at this time,1 35 that a state
legislature might modify the three common law defenses of con13 0 208 U. S. J61.
1a1236 U. S. 1. "A statutory provision which is not a legitimate police
regulation cannot be made such by being placed in the same act with a
police regulation or by being enacted under a title that declares a purpose
which would be a proper object for exercise of that power. * * * Mere
restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated
'public welfare' and treated as a legitimate object of police power."
132 Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229.
133 Franklin v. Union Rys. and Electric Co. of Baltimore (Not reported.
See BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Ed. 2, vol. 1, p. 9).
134 201 N. Y. 271.
135 L. & N. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36.
The court upheld a law making
railroad companies liable for injuries to an employee resulting from negligence of a fellow employee under whom he was working. Chicago B. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549: The court upheld a law abolishing the
fellow servant rule on railroads and denying effect to any contract restricting liability or acceptance of any insurance brought against the railroad by
their employees.
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tributary negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
doctrine, and it also held that classification for purposes of regulation under the police power is a legislative function, and cannot
be interfered with unless it is so unreasonable as to violate the Constitution. But the court held that as this law in part provided a
mandatory rule, and that it takes the property of the employer without regard to whether he was at fault or not, it is unconstitutional.
The Second Employers Liability Cases136 followed former cases
as to the legality of modifying common law defenses, and decided
that Congress could regulate the liability of common carriers by
railroad to their employees, and that such regulation extended to
the intrastate commerce of interstate carriers, and that such regulation superseded all state regulations. The case of C. & 0. Ry.
Co. v. De Atley131 decided that it was not a part of an employee's
duty to discover extraordinary risks. 138 The final development of
the principles determining the constitutionality of compensation
laws took place in 1917. In the case of New York Central R.Y· Co.
v. White 139 the court decided that a compulsory compensation law
which, in lieu of common law liability upon employers to make
compensation for disabling, etc., workers, except where injury is
willful or the worker drunk, is constitutional.140 The decision in
the case of Mountain Tintber Co. v. Washingt01i141 follows the
above decision.
13 ~

223

137 241

U. S.

I.

u. s. 310.

1as In the case of Chicago, K I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 252 U. S. 18, this
case was followed. The court said: "According to our decisions the settled
rule is not that it is the duty of an employee to exercise care to discover
extraordinary dangers that may arise from the negligence of the employer
or of those for whose conduct the employer is responsible, but that the
employee may assume that the employer or his agents have exercised proper
care with respect to his safety until notified to the contrary, unless the
want of care and the danger arising from it are so obvious that an ordinarily
careful person, under the circumstances, would observe and appreciate them."
139 243 u. s. 188.
140 A law "regulating the responsibility of employers for injury or death
of employees, arising out of the employment, bears so close a relation to the
protection of the lives and safety of those concerned that they properly may
be regarded as coming within the category of police regulations."
1 41 243 u. s. 219.
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Hastings, in summing up his article, says:
"The suggestion of ·Marshall was put forward to serve a
need to enable the slave states to minister to their peculiar institutions, while national authority was nevertheless enforced.
It was done almost involuntarily by judges who used it
because it lay at hand and was available. Then it was used
in the states to resist extravagant claims of property and
corporate rights and to extend restraints over the liquor
traffic. After the Civil War it was needed again for the.
same purpose to enable the states to maintain their autonomy
against the reconstruction legislation of Congress and the
new amendments; and, again, it was involuntarily seized
upon and crowded into the gap.
"In such use it was so wrought upon legislation that it
finally triumphed over the bill of rights almost completely,
but the Fourteenth Amendment, almost wholly balked by our
legal habits of its intended effect as to the negro race, was
turned by those habits to the accomplishment of purposes
in relation to property and legislation that the framers of it
did not remotely conceive."
To this we might add that as the labor situation has become more
and more acute the police power has been stretched to the point
where not only hours of labor are regulated by it, but the old common law defenses by which an employer might protect himself have
been rendered useless,142
The police power has served the states well, and through it they
142 li,• th' case of Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400, the
court said: "'The decisions (Second Employer's Liability Cases, N. Y. Central Ry. Co. v. White and Mountain Timber Co. v. White) have established
the propositions that the rules of law concerning the employer's responsibility for personal injury or death of an employee arising in the course of
the employment, is not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest;
that no person has a vested right entitling him to have these any more than
other rules of law remain unchanged for his benefit; and that if we exclude
arbitrary and unreasonable changes, liability may be imposed upon the
employer without fault, and the rules respecting his responsibility to one
emplOyee for the negligence of another, and respecting contributory negligence and assumption of risk, are subject to legislative change."
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have been able to maintain their authority. By it the South was ·
able to preserve her civilization, and onlY. through it can she hope
to ward off the terrible danger of partial and in some cases complete negro control. The founders cif our Constitution never
expected such a condition to arise as that in which the South is now
placed. Had they foreseen it the Constitution would never have
been adopted without provisions to protect the Southern States.
The Supreme Court to the best of its ability has filled their places.
But in other respects, particularly with reference to property rights
and other constitutional guarantees, the states have been given a
tremendous amount of power. The acts passed by virtue of the
police power are legal, and when police power is held to contain
"what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality
or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare" the outcome is hard to see. Particularly at this time, when radicalism and Bolshevism are preponderant~ our constitutional provisions vanish should opinion suddenly
or even gradually change. Justice Strong foresaw this condition
of affairs when he dissented in the decision rendered in the case of
1lfonn v. Illinois. In speaking of the effects of this decision, he said:
"If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in
the principles upon which our republican government is
founded or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against
such invasion of private rights, all property and all business
in the state are held at the mercy of the majority of the
legislature."

When we see a portion of the world gone over to sovietism, and
we hear the increasing cry for socialism in this country, we cannot
do better than tum back to the words of Chief Justice Marshall :
"Whatever respect,might have been felt for the state sovereignty, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the
Constitution viewed with some apprehension the violent acts
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and
that the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves
and their property from the effect of those sudden and
strong passions to which men ·are exposed."

2I4
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(All reference to the recent growth of a national police power
as developed in Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, H 111milton v.
Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, and Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, has been purposely omitted. This
growth has taken place in connection with other changes wrought
by _the war, and whether it will survive or not remains to be seen.)
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